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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores how decision makers could use the Monterey Phoenix (MP) 
behavior modeling tool developed at the Naval Postgraduate School to assess, visualize, 
and prioritize cyber risk in a supply chain. Assessing supply chain risk is a complex 
problem because of the inter-relationships among various parts of the system and 
between the system and its environment. This thesis applies and extends a reusable 
methodology to analyze risk in MP, developed by Navy LCDR Richard Moebius in 2018, 
to the use case of a cyber-attack on a jet fuel supply chain, first modeled by student 
interns from the National Security Agency. It assesses and displays risk for single- and 
multi-threat use cases, and for the first time, adds the global report to an MP model for 
assessing risk. It demonstrates how MP can overcome the limitations of existing tools, 
like the risk table, risk map, and risk matrix. For example, MP automatically generates an 
exhaustive list of potential risk scenarios; MP sequence diagrams provide context on the 
system, its environment, and relationships among different risks; MP easily and quickly 
updates the model to support “what if” questions; and MP displays aggregate and average 
risk across the system and sorts scenarios by a user-defined risk threshold. Finally, the 
work describes how decision makers from different backgrounds can interact with the 
MP model to improve their understanding and prioritization of risk. 
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The May 2021 ransomware attack against the Colonial Pipeline, which transports 
fuel along the Eastern Seaboard of the U.S., highlighted the vulnerability of American 
infrastructure, specifically the fuel supply chain, to cyber-attack. It also prompted the 
president of the United States to issue Executive Order number 14028 to improve the 
ability of the federal government to identify, deter, safeguard, and respond to cyber 
threats.  
This thesis explores how the Monterey Phoenix (MP) behavior modeling tool 
developed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) could help decision makers assess, 
visualize, and prioritize cyber threats to a supply chain. The thesis demonstrates a 
repeatable and extendable methodology for assessing risk in MP, and how MP allows 
decision makers to have a common understanding of how the supply chain works end-to-
end and at specific nodes through tailoring the model. It finds the benefit of using MP to 
assess risk increases as use cases grow in complexity, and MP provides the ability to 
visualize risk more comprehensively than existing risk assessment tools. 
Systems engineers have traditionally used MP, a lightweight formal methods 
behavior modeling tool, to model software architectures and support verification, 
validation, and improvement of system designs. Two student research efforts (Moebius 
2018; Alden et al. 2020) demonstrated the potential to apply MP beyond its software and 
systems engineering roots, and they inspired the research question of this thesis: how 
could decision makers use MP to assess, visualize, and prioritize cyber risk in a supply 
chain? 
To answer the research question, the thesis methodology builds upon the students’ 
prior research. It applies and extends a methodology for using MP to assess system risk 
developed by Navy Lieutenant Commander Richard Moebius in his master’s thesis 
(2018). The Moebius methodology has seven steps: create a behavioral model of the 
intended operation; add negative alternatives to the operation; add risk attributes (e.g., 
impact and likelihood); calculate or assign impact to negative outcomes; calculate or 
xvi 
assign likelihood to negative outcomes; use impact and likelihood to calculate risk; and 
output desired format of risk for decision makers (Moebius 2018, 16–17). This thesis 
applies the Moebius methodology to the use case of a cyber-attack on a military jet fuel 
supply chain, first modeled in MP by a group of student interns from the National 
Security Agency’s Monterey Phoenix Virtual Internship Program (MPVIP) as part of 
their capstone project (Alden et al. 2020).  
This thesis also extends the Moebius methodology by applying the global report 
function in MP to risk assessment for the first time. The global report function conducts 
queries across all event traces for information the modeler prescribes. Then, it displays 
the information in a concise report card at the top right of the model screen, and it marks 
the traces that contain the prescribed information. This thesis uses the global report to 
identify the total and average risk across all traces in the model, the highest risk and its 
corresponding trace, and which traces in the model meet a prescribed risk threshold. The 
modeler can then sort the traces by those marked using the standard sort menu in MP. As 
a result of adding the global report, this thesis extends Moebius’ methodology and 
renames step six to account for the new actions of querying and sorting risk.  
The thesis applies the extended Moebius methodology and demonstrates the 
utility of MP in supporting risk assessment through three models related to the use case: 
one to calculate the risk of a cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline, another to calculate 
the risk of a cyber-attack on barge operations that transport fuel in the supply chain, and a 
third to calculate the risk of two cyber threats to the supply chain. Risk calculations use 
the simple risk model, which assigns a single variable for probability and impact (Smith 
and Merritt 2002, 21). This thesis uses the term likelihood instead of probability to reflect 
the fact that all measures in the use cases are notional. The jet fuel supply chain risk 
assessments demonstrate the ability of MP to help decision makers understand risk in 
systems of varying complexity. The barge use case demonstrates how MP can produce a 
smaller model to simplify or more deeply examine risk assessment in one specific aspect 
of the supply chain. The model of the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack and the model with 
two cyber threats demonstrate the ability of MP to assess and visualize how negative 
alternatives impact the operation of the entire supply chain.  
xvii 
There are four main conclusions of this research.  
1. The Moebius methodology is repeatable and extendable. There is enough 
rigor in the methodology to guide a modeler through using MP to assess 
risk, and enough flexibility for the modeler to tailor the model variables, 
risk calculations, and display output to the needs of different use cases and 
decision makers. 
2. MP allows decision makers to achieve and assess a common 
understanding of how the supply chain works end-to-end and how cyber 
threats could impact different aspects of the supply chain. Tailoring the 
model can help decision makers resolve differences in knowledge, 
assumptions, and perspectives, which is especially helpful in addressing 
supply chain risk because decision makers often come from different 
organizations and backgrounds representing different aspects of the supply 
chain.  
3. The benefit of using MP to assess risk increases as use cases grow in 
complexity. The global report for the simple barge model provided insight 
into the total and average risk across all the traces, but with only 3 total 
traces, it was not time consuming to manually review each trace. In the 
model with two cyber threats, MP returned 12 traces, making the global 
report and the marked traces much faster to digest than manual reviewing 
traces to find those of greatest interest. Additionally, the ability of MP to 
automatically generate 12 potential scenarios from the two-threat model 
was much faster—and potentially more effective—than having humans 
brainstorm and model those scenarios in a systems modeling language or 
other visualization tool. Reducing manual work developing and 
interpreting the model provides decision makers more time to discuss and 
debate risk mitigation strategies. 
4. Finally, MP provides the ability to visualize risk more comprehensively 
than existing risk assessment tools. The risk table, risk map, and risk 
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matrix have limitations in how they communicate the context of the 
system, identify interdependencies among risks, respond to real-time 
“what if” drills, and display aggregate risk. MP has features that can 
overcome these limitations. For example, the sequence diagram in MP 
helps decision makers visualize the flow of events within and among the 
supply chain nodes, and it communicates important context about the 
system and its environment, including order and precedence, cause and 
effect, people and places, behavior attributes like timing, and 
interdependencies among risks. Understanding interdependencies can help 
decision makers develop different mitigation strategies, perhaps 
prioritizing contributing factors to address the root cause of a vulnerability 
over addressing more visible symptoms of an attack. Modelers can also 
easily update the assumptions and variables in the model and quickly 
rerun the simulation in seconds to regenerate scenarios and risk 
assessments so decision makers do not need to delay a decision waiting for 
updated analyses. Finally, MP visualizes aggregate risk through the global 
report, which displays total risk and average risk. This view allows 
decision makers to compare risk across multiple models and use cases. 
Modeling risk in MP, especially supply chain risk, is still nascent research. Future 
research should improve upon the quality and type of assessments MP can do, the 
visualizations it creates to support decision makers, and the ability of the modeling 
software to handle more complex use cases. In the meantime, this thesis has unlimited 
distribution with the intent of sharing the Moebius methodology, and the extensions from 
this thesis, with analysts and decision makers so they can see the potential benefits of MP 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early May 2021, DarkSide hackers affiliated with a Russia-linked cybercrime 
group conducted a ransomware attack against the Colonial Pipeline, which transports 
about 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day from the Gulf Coast of the United States to its 
Eastern Seaboard as part of the U.S. fuel supply chain. The attack resulted in the Colonial 
Pipeline Company closing the pipeline for five days, causing gas shortages, long lines at 
the pump, and higher fuel prices across the Eastern U.S. The Colonial Pipeline Company 
also paid DarkSide $4.4 million in ransom to prevent them from leaking about 100 
gigabytes of data they stole in the attack (Turton and Mehrotra 2021). The cyber-attack 
highlighted the vulnerability of American infrastructure, specifically the fuel supply 
chain, to cyber-attack, and prompted the President of the U.S. to issue Executive Order 
number 14028 to improve the ability of the federal government to identify, deter, 
safeguard, and respond to cyber threats (Sigalos 2021). This thesis explores how the 
Monterey Phoenix modeling tool developed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
could help decision makers assess, visualize, and prioritize cyber vulnerabilities in a 
supply chain and inform mitigation options to improve the resiliency of the chain. This 
chapter discusses the motivation for the thesis, the thesis research question, the scope of 
the thesis, and the benefits of this study. It also provides an overview of the organization 
of the thesis.  
A. MOTIVATION 
Recognizing vulnerability, understanding risk, and prioritizing mitigation 
measures in a supply chain is a complex problem because of the inter-relationships of 
various parts of the system. It would be beneficial for humans to have tools to help them 
estimate, visualize, and prioritize cyber risk. One candidate tool is Monterey Phoenix 
(MP), a lightweight formal methods behavior modeling tool designed by faculty and 
students at NPS. Systems engineers have used MP to model software architectures and 
support verification, validation, and improvement of system designs by modeling and 
experimenting with potential system behaviors early in the life cycle.  
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In the summer of 2020, a group of student interns from the National Security 
Agency (NSA) used MP in a new way: to model a cyber-attack on a jet fuel supply chain 
(Alden et al. 2020). The interns’ work demonstrated the potential for MP to expand 
beyond its software and systems engineering roots. After seeing the interns’ presentation, 
this author wondered if MP could be a useful tool for helping decision makers assess, 
visualize, and prioritize risks across a system to best allocate limited resources for risk 
mitigation. Personal experience provided numerous anecdotes of executives struggling to 
understand and act on system-wide cyber risk, especially when different organizations 
owned or operated different parts of the end-to-end system. Challenges in decision 
making often resulted from:  
• Siloed views regarding system vulnerabilities, which could bias executives 
to prioritize the part of the system they knew most, or scapegoat the part 
of the system they knew least 
• Lack of a common framework through which executives could share and 
compare their assessments of vulnerabilities and mitigations that also 
provided transparency into the thinking and data underpinning those 
assessments 
• Lack of a common visualization tool that showed the end-to-end system 
context to allow more in-depth conversations about how various 
vulnerabilities and mitigations impact the whole system and not just a 
single node 
• The need to reschedule decision meetings because those in the room could 
not answer “what if” questions related to changes in assumptions, risk 
tolerance levels, or other updated factors because experts needed time to 
recalculate their assessment based on new information  
The interns’ presentation highlighted several features in MP that could potentially 
address these challenges, including the ability to: 
3 
• Model systems, processes, capabilities, organizations, actors, and 
environments to account for and display the various elements of a system 
end-to-end  
• Identify the behaviors and interactions that occur among the elements to 
understand dependencies, gaps, and seams that might exist in the system 
or among organizations that manage and operate the system  
• Quantitatively calculate and visually depict both single node and system-
wide behavior to understand how a node fits into the broader system 
context 
• Visually present information so even non-technical observers can interpret 
the model, making complex systems easier to understand and analysis 
more board-room-ready  
• Provide instantaneous feedback on changes to the model, which could 
support “what if” questions more readily and, ideally, lead to more timely 
decisions 
This thesis explores these features to understand how MP might be a useful tool 
for supporting decision makers in assessing and visualizing risk. It builds on the NSA 
interns’ thoughtful work, and an earlier work by Navy LCDR Richard Moebius (2018) 
that demonstrated a reusable methodology in MP to analyze risk. By applying and 
extending the Moebius methodology to the interns’ jet fuel supply chain cyber-attack use 
case, this thesis demonstrates the extent to which decision makers could leverage MP to 
assess, visualize, and prioritize risk across a system. This kind of tool could be 
particularly helpful to executives as they determine how to allocate limited resources to 
mitigate cyber risks. 
The research on the use case in this thesis started about a year before the real-
world cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline, yet the jet fuel supply chain use case 
features a similar attack. The parallel to real-world events, and the spike in the national 
dialogue about vulnerabilities in U.S. critical infrastructure as a result of the cyber-attack 
4 
on the Pipeline, suggest there is a need for better tools to help decision makers assess and 
prioritize supply chain risk. The events also invigorated the motivation behind this thesis.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How could decision makers use the Monterey Phoenix (MP) behavior modeling 
tool to assess, visualize, and prioritize cyber risk in a supply chain? 
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The scope of this thesis is to apply and extend a reusable methodology developed 
by Moebius (2018) for modeling risk in MP and demonstrate its application on the use 
case of a cyber-attack on a military jet fuel supply chain. The extension of the Moebius 
method includes the introduction of the global report function in MP to calculate and 
summarize risk across a series of events. The thesis assumes knowledge about the use 
case that is publicly accessible online. It cannot answer questions pertaining to behavior 
or risk outcomes in the jet fuel pipeline that may be classified or that have not been 
documented publicly. This thesis does not describe how to model in MP since that 
methodology has been documented in other research publications as well as in MP 
handbooks and tutorials (Auguston 2009 and 2020; Giammarco and Auguston 2019; 
Monterey Phoenix Home n.d.).  
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis demonstrates how MP models may be used to better assess and 
prioritize risk in a supply chain. Even though executives must frequently make decisions 
about how to allocate limited resources to mitigate risk in systems, they do not fully 
leverage the capabilities and visualization available in MP today. This thesis helps 
executives, systems engineers, and cyber security experts become more informed of the 
potential for MP to support risk assessment and prioritization decisions, and it 
recommends ways to enhance MP capabilities to support risk assessment in the future. 
This thesis also makes the Moebius methodology accessible to a broader 
audience. Moebius’ thesis used government-sensitive examples to demonstrate his 
methodology, so his thesis distribution extended to DOD and DOD contractors only. This 
5 
thesis uses an unclassified example with unlimited distribution so non-DOD 
researchers—and practitioners—can learn from Moebius’ pathfinding methodology and 
the extended methodology demonstrated in this thesis.  
E. OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
The next chapter of this thesis provides an overview of related works, including a 
literature review, discussion of current risk assessment tools, and description of the two 
student works underpinning this research. Chapter III describes the methodology this 
thesis uses. Chapter IV applies the methodology to the jet fuel supply chain use case and 
extends the Moebius methodology by adding the global report. Chapter V presents 
conclusions and recommendations for further research. The Appendix contains the MP 
code for the models discussed in the thesis.  
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II. RELATED WORKS 
This chapter reviews existing work related to this thesis. It presents a summary of 
related literature, a comparison of the features of current risk assessment approaches and 
those of MP, and an overview of the two student projects this thesis directly builds upon.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is an abundance of literature in risk management that includes textbook-
style publications with broad and deep explanations on how to define, measure, and 
mitigate risk (Wolke 2017), as well as shorter executive publications from consultant 
firms like Booz Allen Hamilton, McKinsey & Company, KMPG, Boston Consulting 
Group, Price Waterhouse Cooper, and dozens of others, that provide advice on how to 
apply risk management to common business problems (Consultantcy.org 2018). There is 
literature that describes risk management in the context of project management (Project 
Management Institute [PMI] 2013) and product development (Smith and Merritt 2002), 
which address risk management planning, identification, analysis, response planning, and 
controlling risk to reduce the occurrence and impact of negative events in the project. 
Federal government agencies have developed organization-specific policies and 
methodologies for managing risk (National Aeronautic Space Agency [NASA] 2011; 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering [DASD 
SE] 2017; Burke and Morgan 2018). These approaches use a variety of tools and 
techniques to assess risk. The next section discusses some of these approaches and 
compares them with features in MP.  
There is also literature focused specifically on supply chain risk management 
(SCRM). A supply chain is a network of companies at different locations, also called 
nodes, which work together through links, or networks, to provide goods or services for 
end users (Goldsby et al. 2014, 6–7). SCRM literature defines and categorizes the variety 
of risks related to supply chain effectiveness and discusses strategies to manage and 
mitigate risk (Ho et al. 2015). There is also literature on enterprise risk management 
(ERM), which is an integrated and systemic approach to managing all the risks a 
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company faces (Dickinson 2001). Literature on the risk of cyber-attack in supply chains 
finds that supply chains require a holistic approach to risk management, and there is a 
need for empirical models and collaborative approaches to increase supply chain cyber 
resilience (Ghadge 2019). 
Finally, there are multiple publications on MP that describe how the modeling 
tool works and ways to use it to design, validate, and verify system and system-of-system 
architectures and behaviors. These works highlight the objective of MP to provide a 
framework for specifying system behaviors, its parts, and its environment, as well as 
interactions among them. Most works also the benefits of MP, including its ability to 
identify unintended behaviors, to highlight constraints on behavior and dependencies 
among actions involved in the behavior, and to provide different ways to visualize 
behaviors (Auguston 2020, 6). This thesis also leverages MP tutorials for best practices 
on how to use MP (Giammarco and Auguston 2019). 
B. CURRENT RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACHES 
A key motivation for this thesis was exploring how MP could help decision 
makers improve their ability to prioritize risk compared to existing approaches. 
Prioritization decisions depend heavily on the quality of the risk assessment, as well as on 
the ability to communicate that assessment effectively to decision makers. This section 
discusses two limitations of current risk assessment approaches and the unique features of 
MP that could help overcome those limits.  
1. Blind Spot Limitations  
First, current risk assessment approaches rely heavily on humans to think of all 
possible negative consequences when assessing a system (NASA 2017, 43; Burke and 
Morgan 2018, 6–7). NASA has one of the most comprehensive guides to risk 
management available. At more than 230 pages, it outlines multiple rigorous techniques, 
tools, and heuristics for risk informed decision making, including evaluating the risk 
analysis for bias and verifying and validating the analysis with engineering tools and 
methods (NASA 2011, 65). The Cyber Risk Assessment (CRA) process used by Naval 
Aviation Systems Command (NAVAIR) also uses a systematic, analysis-rich approach to 
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assessing risk (Burke and Morgan 2018, 6–7). Yet, NASA and NAVAIR rely primarily 
on stakeholder input and system decomposition models as the main way to identify 
system vulnerabilities and alternatives (NASA 2011, 43; Burke and Morgan 2018, 5). 
Even the quality checks NASA conducts occur only on previously identified risks and 
alternatives. In other words, if someone does not think about a specific scenario 
occurring, it will not appear in the risk assessment. Former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld famously called these risks “unknown unknowns” (Rumsfeld 2002). These 
blind spots could result in suboptimal risk mitigation approaches, wasted resources, or 
worse outcomes if unidentified risks occur and the organization is unprepared to address 
them.  
MP helps overcome human limitations by automatically generating scenarios that 
could result in risk. MP models the behavior of each component of the system separately 
from the behaviors that result from systems interacting with each other and their 
environment. Rather than relying on humans to manually specify the scenarios they can 
conceptualize, MP automatically generates all possible expressions of system behavior, 
within the model scope,1 that could result from the system design, even scenarios that 
humans may not anticipate or that they may rule out as a result of biases (Giammarco et 
al. 2014, 205–208). MP exposes human blind spots so decision makers can be confident 
they are considering all possible risks, not just those humans were able—or willing—to 
identify.  
The scope-complete scenario coverage feature of MP is especially beneficial as 
systems, and systems-of-systems, grow in complexity. Complex systems have more 
possible configurations and behaviors, including emergent behaviors, than humans can 
comprehend on their own (Giammarco et al. 2014, 204). Additionally, complex systems 
often touch numerous stakeholders, including designers, owners, operators, maintainers, 
resource allocators, information managers, and more, making coordination of all 
 
1 Scope is a limit the modeler sets on how many iterations MP will conduct on events in the model that 
occur multiple times (Quartuccio and Giammarco 2019, 394-395). For example, computer programs often 
include loops to repeat a specified action multiple times until a certain outcome occurs (Kodable 2019). MP 
would run that loop the number of times set by the scope in the model. 
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stakeholder viewpoints on the model time intensive. Organizations can make better use of 
stakeholder time by asking them to provide feedback on the exhaustive set of MP-
generated scenarios, instead of relying solely on brainstorming sessions trying to come up 
with potential options.  
2. Visualization Limitations 
The second common limitation of existing risk approaches is in how they present 
risk assessment results. Regardless of whether analysts use simple or sophisticated 
analysis tools to calculate risk, they usually present the results of the analysis to decision 
makers in the form of a risk table, risk map, or risk matrix (Smith and Merritt 2002; 
NASA 2011; PMI 2013; DASD SE 2017; Burke and Morgan 2018). These three formats 
are simple and familiar visualizations, but alone they limit the type and depth of 
information presented on the risk assessment in a decision forum. NASA’s risk 
management guide highlights the importance of tailoring the presentation of risk analysis 
to the needs of decision makers, and including a variety of results, including scenario 
descriptions, risk results, and sensitivity studies, to ensure decision makers have the 
information they need to make informed decisions about risk management (NASA 2011, 
64). This section provides an overview of the risk table, risk map, and risk cube formats, 
their limitations, and the features in MP that could improve the visualization of risk 
beyond what these formats alone provide.  
a. Risk Table 
A risk table conveys information through the rows and columns of a spreadsheet. 
Tables can present a variety of information from a risk assessment, including the 
relationship among risk attributes (Smith and Merritt 2002, 158), risk attribute values 
(Smith and Merritt 2002, 78), risk priorities and urgency (NASA 2011, 138; Smith and 
Merritt 2002, 88), a description of risk consequences (NASA 2011, 109), and any other 
information that fits neatly in rows and columns. Figure 1 shows an example of a risk 
table from the NASA risk handbook (NASA 2011, 87). It describes four alternatives a 
decision maker could choose and the risk each option has in meeting four different 
criteria—time to completion, project cost, data volume, and planetary contamination—as 
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well as total risk for each option. It includes color coding to draw the viewer’s eye to 
different levels of risk more quickly. Well-constructed tables, like this one, provide 
information-rich visualizations in a clear and concise way for decision makers.  
 
Figure 1. NASA Imposed Constraint Risk Matrix. Source: NASA (2011). 
Despite their approachability, there are three key limitations of a table.  
• Context: Risks appear out of context when presented in a table, so 
decision makers need to be familiar with the design of the system, 
including the function and behavior of system elements, the relationships 
among different elements of the system, and the relationships the system 
has with its environment in order to fully understand the risk information 
presented in the table.  
• Interdependencies: A table cannot convey the interdependencies among 
risks, since each row and column represent individual scenarios or risks 
(NASA 2011, 143). Knowing possible dependencies among risks could 
help decision makers identify strategies that mitigate aspects of multiple 
risks at once, instead of a single risk at a time. Without the knowledge of 
these connections, that approach to mitigation is not available for decision 
makers to consider.  
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• Static Data: Tables present a snapshot of the data from the risk 
assessment, meaning the data is disconnected from the models and 
analysis from which it came. This means analysts are unlikely to be able to 
answer “what if” questions from decision makers in the board room. They 
must take the questions for action, change the assumptions or risk 
attributes in their models or analytic tools, update the table, and reschedule 
the meeting with decision makers before mitigating the risks in question. 
This could unnecessarily waste time, especially if decision makers are not 
familiar with the system or the risks.  
b. Risk Map 
A risk map, like the example in Figure 2, plots each risk on a graph with an x-axis 
representing impact and y-axis representing likelihood. The graph may also include one 
or more threshold lines to partition the graph into different sections that represent 
different risk tolerance levels (Smith and Merritt 2002, 35).  
 
Figure 2. Risk Map. Source: Smith and Merritt (2002). 
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The benefit of a risk map is its ability to display both the likelihood and the 
impact of each single risk in comparison to all other potential risks. The visual display of 
how likelihood and impact contribute to overall risk helps decision makers simply and 
quickly see how many risks fall into each tolerance level, and why, so they can prioritize 
actions based on the attributes they value most (Smith and Merritt 2004, 212).  
A risk map has the same limitations as a risk table: the risks appear out of context, 
meaning decision makers need to have some baseline level of familiarity with the system 
they are evaluating; risks on the map appear as individual, separate entities, which 
prevents decision makers from understanding interdependencies that could offer 
alternative mitigation options; and a risk map is a snapshot of data from the risk 
assessment meaning questions from decision makers may take more time to address if 
analysts need to rerun calculations back in their office.  
A risk map has one additional limitation, as well: it cannot deal with aggregate 
risks (NASA 2011, 143). A risk map displays the total number of risks and how they 
spread above and below the threshold line, but it does not contain a value for total risk. If 
decision makers needed to compare the risks of two or more different use cases, it would 
be hard to discern total risk by just comparing the risk maps for the different use cases, 
especially if there are many use cases to review.  
c. Risk Matrix  
The risk matrix is a popular way to display risk, especially within DOD (DASD 
SE 2017, 27–30; NASA 2011, 143–145). Similar to a risk map, the x-axis presents values 
for likelihood and the y-axis presents values for impact. The intersection of a likelihood 
and impact value creates a box, which is red, yellow, or green depending on where the 
box appears in the chart: red represents high risk in the upper right corner of the box, 
green represents low risk in the lower left corner of the box, and yellow represents 
medium risk in the diagonal strip in between the red and green corners (DASD SE 2017, 
27). Figure 3 shows an example of a risk matrix from NAVAIR, which they use in their 
CRA method (Burke and Morgan 2018, 8). The figure demonstrates how an organization 
can customize the attributes and values that underpin likelihood and impact based on the 
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type of risk being assessed. Like a risk map, it is quick and easy to see where risks fall at 
each tolerance level, allowing decision makers to prioritize the highest risk actions.  
 
 
Figure 3. NAVAIR CRA Scoring Risk Matrix. Source: Burke and Morgan 
(2018). 
The limitations of risk matrices echo those of risk tables and risk maps: risks 
appear out of context, they cannot convey interdependencies among risks, they present a 
snapshot of data, and they cannot visualize aggregate risks well. NASA uses a criticality 
ranking to prioritize risks then maps those rankings to the matrix, which helps overcome 
some aspects of the context and interaction limitations; however, it is unclear how 
widespread the use of such rankings is in DOD (NASA 2011, 144–145). Figure 3 shows 
NAVAIR uses mission criticality as one of the variables that underpin the impact score in 
their CRA method, but the method does not prioritize overall risk in the same way as 
NASA (Burke and Morgan 2018, 8). Additionally, the DOD risk guide directs program 
teams to base risk levels in the matrix on cost, schedule, and performance risk, then use 
additional factors, like time criticality and interrelationship of risks, to prioritize the risk 
after completing the matrix (DASD SE 2017, 27).  
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Even with factors included in the risk matrix to provide additional context and 
account for risk dependency, the risk matrix still presents a subset of data, and it cannot 
visualize aggregate risks well. Risk assessment would benefit from other tools that could 
provide context for risk in the system, convey interactions and dependencies among 
system elements and risk, present data in dynamic ways, and visualize aggregate risks.  
d. MP Visualization Features  
MP has several visualization features that could overcome the limitations of the 
risk table, risk map, and risk matrix. In MP’s interactive environment, modelers 
separately define the behavior of the system from the interactions among systems and 
among systems and the environment, so the modeler has flexibility and control in 
describing how the system should behave (Quartuccio and Giammarco 2019, 395). MP 
automatically generates different use cases from the model and displays them in a 
sequence diagram with boxes for actors and events, and arrows for relationships 
(Auguston 2020, 7). The relationship arrows identify where interactions and 
dependencies exist between different parts of the model. These relationships can apply to 
systems and risks. Modelers can add tables and bar charts to the sequence diagram to 
display dependencies, as well. Modelers can also easily update the assumptions and 
variables in the model and quickly rerun the simulation in seconds to answer “what if” 
questions from decision makers in real time. The global calculation in MP can calculate 
values across use cases, which could display aggregate risks from the model. These 
features visually present information more comprehensively than a risk table, risk map, 
and risk matrix, and they inspired the research in this thesis on how MP can model and 
display risk in a supply chain. 
C. MOEBIUS THESIS OVERVIEW 
An earlier research effort that sought to demonstrate the ability of MP to model 
risk was a thesis completed by Navy Lieutenant Commander Richard Moebius in 2018. 
He recognized the potential of MP to evolve beyond its software and systems engineering 
roots to also support risk assessment. His master’s thesis research question was, “Can a 
behavioral model implemented with Monterey Phoenix be used to analyze risk?” The 
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scope of the thesis was to demonstrate a reusable methodology to analyze risk and apply 
the methodology to four use cases (Moebius 2018, 2). The four examples Moebius used 
were the process fire order phase of a Mark 48 Advanced Capability torpedo launch 
sequence employed by U.S. submarines, a hydrazine bottle leak aboard a NASA 
spacecraft, an airline airport check-in kiosk process, and a Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) cyber risk assessment (CRA) for a notional system (Moebius 2018, 30–55). 
Moebius created a methodology, described in Chapter III, for using MP to model 
a system, calculate risk, and visually display the risk assessment results in the model. In 
subsequent chapters, this thesis applies and extends the Moebius methodology through a 
jet fuel supply chain use case and the addition of a global report.  
D. NSA INTERN PROJECT ON ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT  
The jet fuel supply chain use case in this thesis builds upon work done in 2020 by 
a team of NSA interns at NPS. As part of their summer capstone project, they used MP to 
model risk in two use cases: the effects of a cyber-attack on a jet fuel pipeline supply 
chain; and the impact former NSA contractor Edward Snowden had on the U.S. and 
Allied nations by leaking sensitive NSA information to the public (Alden et al. 2020). 
The MP models they created assessed operational impact, identified emergent behaviors, 
and determined financial, reputational, and mission consequences associated with each 
use case (Alden et al. 2020). They described MP as a tool organizations could use to 
bridge the gap between expert cyber security analysts and executive decision makers as 
part of a broader ERM process (Alden et al. 2020). They explained how their findings 
could inform ERM policies related to how much risk to take or where to invest resources 
in mitigations (Alden et al. 2020).  
The NSA interns’ research demonstrated how MP could model multiple nodes in 
a supply chain, introduce a cyber-attack as a bad actor in the system, and calculate 
potential immediate or delayed impacts of the attack (Alden et al. 2020). This thesis 
leverages the jet fuel pipeline model created by the NSA interns and modifies it to be 
capable of assessing risk across the supply chain. Chapter IV describes the NSA interns’ 
model in more detail.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis applies and extends the Moebius methodology (2018) for using MP to 
assess system risk. Section A of this chapter provides an overview of the Moebius 
methodology. Section B describes the simple risk model, which this thesis uses to 
calculate risk as part of Step 6 of the Moebius methodology. Section C describes the 
global report function in MP and how it extends Step 6 of the Mobius methodology to 
query across all traces, identify aggregate risk, and mark traces of interest. The next 
chapter applies the extended methodology to the use case of assessing the risk of a cyber-
attack on a military jet fuel supply chain.  
A. MOEBIUS METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
The Moebius methodology includes the following seven steps. 
Step 1: Create a behavioral model of the intended operation. Behavior is the 
set of events that happens in a system or in the environment as it interacts with the 
system. Each event has a beginning and an end and may have a duration. Events also 
include two relationships—precedence and inclusion—that establish order. Precedence 
describes the sequence of events in time: one event precedes another, they happen 
concurrently, or they both happen without an ordering relationship (Auguston 2009, 
1032–1033). Inclusion establishes a hierarchy of routines and sub-routines for each event 
(Auguston 2009, 1032).  
Moebius (2018) employs the personification of interacting systems to highlight 
how modelers can think of system components and the environment as actors in the 
behavior model. Actors are producers or consumers of actions that impact mission 
completion. They could include adversaries, allies, or other systems (Moebius 2018, 15). 
Personification of systems is a helpful technique when designing behavior models for 
cyber and supply chain risk because it helps modelers identify both the technical and 
human elements of the system and its environment.  
Moebius recommends scoping the model to include all the behaviors of all actors 
required to accomplish the mission, plus events that could detract from mission 
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accomplishment because the intent of the model is to evaluate the risk of mission failure. 
The sets of events among actors over time result in an observable outcome, which 
enables the evaluation of risk (Moebius 2018, 16). 
Step 2: Add negative alternatives to the operation. To identify negative 
alternatives to mission accomplishment, consider the behavior of different actors in the 
system and the behavior that occurs in the environment. For example, one could modify 
existing actions so they are not performed or introduce new actions that result in 
outcomes different than mission accomplishment. The model will only evaluate the risk 
associated with negative alternative behaviors added to the model (Moebius 2018, 16). 
Step 3: Add risk attributes. Once the behavioral model is complete, add 
attributes for risk, including probability and impact (Moebius 2018, 17).  
Step 4: Calculate or assign impact to negative outcomes. Subject matter experts 
should define the values for the attributes added in the previous step, document the reasoning 
behind their opinions, then add those values to the model (Moebius 2018, 17). 
Step 5: Calculate or assign likelihood to negative outcomes. Similar to Step 4, 
subject matter experts define the values for the attributes added in the previous step, 
document the reasoning behind their opinions, and add those values to the model 
(Moebius 2018, 17).  
Step 6: Use impact and likelihood to calculate risk. Moebius gives flexibility to 
the modeler to determine how to calculate risk based on impact and likelihood 
recognizing that decision makers may prefer different approaches to evaluation. For 
example, one could average, multiply, add, or just display the values that contribute to 
risk (Moebius 2018, 17). The next chapter describes the approach this thesis takes to 
calculating risk, but Moebius’ methodology, and the MP program itself, allow a variety 
of approaches. In fact, this flexibility is what allows this thesis to extend Moebius’ 
methodology to incorporate the global report in MP. 
Step 7: Output desired format of risk for decision maker. Similar to Step 6, 
Moebius gives the modeler the flexibility to display risk in a way that is most useful to 
the decision maker (Moebius 2018, 17).  
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B. RISK CALCULATION METHODOLOGY 
Step 6 of the Moebius methodology allows the modeler to determine how to 
calculate risk based on impact and probability of risk. Multiple models, at varying levels 
of detail, exist for calculating risk. This thesis uses the simple risk model, which uses 
probability and impact to measure risk in the most streamlined way of all the models. In 
the simple risk model, probability includes the possibility of the risk event happening and 
the possibility of the various impacts occurring. The simple risk model defines drivers as 
the factors that both influence the risk event and its potential impacts. Because the simple 
risk model has the fewest categories and steps, it can mask certain nuances, such as risk 
that occurs when the probability of an event is low, but the probability of its impact is 
high. A higher fidelity risk model, like the standard risk model that tracks the probability 
and drivers for events and impacts separately, can improve risk resolution planning 
(Smith and Merritt 2002, 21–22). Figure 4 depicts the standard risk model and the simple 
risk model for comparison.  
 
Figure 4. Standard and Simple Risk Model Overview. Adapted from Smith 
and Merritt (2017). 
Figure 4 also notes that one can use probability or likelihood to understand the 
chance of an event or impact occurring. It is helpful to clarify the difference between 
probability and likelihood so decision makers understand how much confidence to have 
in the risk assessment. Probability conveys greater confidence because possible results 
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and they always sum to one. Likelihood conveys a 
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more hypothetical value and does not need to sum to one (Gallistel 2015). This thesis 
uses likelihood as the basis for risk analysis since all measures in the use cases are 
notional. To simplify readability, this document uses the term “likelihood” instead of 
probability from this point forward, recognizing that risk assessment can employ 
measures that vary in robustness, from notional to analytically-derived values.  
C. GLOBAL REPORT OVERVIEW 
Moebius demonstrated how MP can calculate risk for specific event traces. This 
thesis extends the Moebius methodology by adding the global report function in MP. The 
global report queries all event traces for information the modeler prescribes. Then, it 
displays that information in a concise report that appears as a small box in the top right of 
the model screen and it marks the traces containing the prescribed information.  
To apply global risk, a modeler builds the global view in MP after first describing 
the intended behavior of the system and negative alternatives in the model. MP treats the 
global query, coded in the GLOBAL section of the MP schema, as an event itself, with 
$$TRACE being the code in the schema that reflects all event traces in the model. As an 
event, GLOBAL has its own attributes, which the modeler designates in the MP schema 
as GLOBAL.attribute_name. A modeler can establish values for the attributes using 
COORDINATE loops, which are interaction constraints in the MP schema, and different 
views of the model using SAY clauses, which tell MP what information to highlight on 
the screen. Once a set of traces exists, the global function accumulates calculations across 
the all the traces to identify the aggregate risk in the model, and it performs a global 
query across the traces to identify which traces have the characteristics the modeler 
prescribes (Auguston 2020, 107).  
This thesis uses the global report to identify total risk, average risk, and those 
traces with the highest risk from a cyber-attack on the military jet fuel supply chain. The 
models in this thesis are simple, but they demonstrate the utility of the global report 
function, which only increases with more complex systems. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY  
This chapter applies and extends the methodology developed by Moebius (2018) 
to the use case of a cyber-attack on a jet fuel supply chain. The sections progress through 
the seven steps of Moebius’ methodology, each building out portions of the MP model 
for the use case. Step 6 extends the Moebius methodology by adding the global report in 
MP to query risk across all the traces and identify aggregate risks and traces of interest 
from the model. The chapter concludes with a discussion, in Step 7, of how to present the 
findings from the MP model to help decision makers understand and address risk 
associated with a cyber-attack on the jet fuel supply chain.  
A. STEP 1: CREATE A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF THE INTENDED 
OPERATION 
The first step of the Moebius methodology is to create a behavioral model of the 
intended operation. Mobius recommends the model include all the events required to 
accomplish the mission, as well as events that could detract from mission 
accomplishment (Moebius 2018, 15–16). This section applies Step 1 of the methodology 
in three parts. First, it describes the behavior model for the intended operation of the end-
to-end jet fuel supply chain. Then, it describes a simpler behavior model for the intended 
operation of the barge that moves jet fuel between two nodes in the supply chain to 
demonstrate how MP can tailored analysis to examine a subset of the supply chain. These 
two models are the foundation for applying the remaining steps of the Moebius 
methodology to the jet fuel supply chain use case. This section concludes by 
demonstrating an option in MP to incorporate additional attributes of the supply chain, 
such as the timing of events across nodes, to provide deeper insight into the behavior of 
the system.  
1. Modeling the Supply Chain End-to-End 
The intended operation of the jet fuel supply chain is transporting and refining a 
barrel of commercial Jet A fuel from the U.S. petroleum industry to Joint Base Andrews 
(JBA) where the military-grade F-24 fuel can be used for U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
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missions. The events required to accomplish the mission occur at five nodes in the supply 
chain (Inman 2017). According to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which oversees 
the supply chains that ensure military aircraft have enough fuel to support mission 
requirements, these nodes and their corresponding events are: 
1. U.S. Petroleum Industry – Produces commercial Jet A fuel and ships it 
to the Colonial Pipeline  
2. Colonial Pipeline – Receives the Jet A fuel and transports the fuel to the 
Defense Fuel Support Point (DFSP) in Baltimore, Maryland 
3. DFSP Baltimore – Receives Jet A fuel; transforms the Jet A fuel into F-
24 military grade fuel by adding inhibitors for icing, static, and corrosion; 
puts the F-24 jet fuel in storage tanks; loads the F-24 fuel on a barge; and 
transports the fuel to the DFSP in Anacostia, Washington, D.C. 
4. DFSP Anacostia – Receives the F-24 jet fuel, checks its quality and 
amount, and transports it via pipeline to tanks on JBA 
5. JBA – Receives the jet fuel, and uses the fuel for USAF missions  
Figure 5 displays the behavioral model for the intended operation of the jet supply 
chain. The Appendix Section A contains the code for the model.  
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Figure 5. MP Model of the Intended Operation of the Jet Fuel Supply 
Chain (Scope 1, Trace 1). Source: Alden et al. (2020). 
The model in Figure 5 accounts for all the major events described by Inman 
(2017) at each of the five nodes. It also includes a sixth node—a cyber threat—to account 
for events that could detract from mission accomplishment. The event associated with the 
cyber threat in the MP model in Figure 5 is “do nothing,” which means the cyber threat 
has no impact on the jet fuel supply chain; the chain operates as intended. Step 2 of the 
Moebius methodology introduces negative alternatives to the intended operation of the 
system, which includes assigning cyber-attack events to the cyber threat. Step 1 of the 
methodology creates the baseline model to confirm the system works as intended before 
introducing any negative impacts.  
2. Modeling Part of the Supply Chain 
In addition to modeling the end-to-end supply chain to understand how a cyber-
attack at one node impacts the system overall, one can model events in MP for just a 
subset of the supply chain. This more focused analysis may be useful when trying to 
simplify information for decision-makers, or when collecting or presenting more detailed 
evidence to support a specific finding or recommendation.  
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To demonstrate how MP can analyze a subset of the supply chain, the author 
partnered with Nathan Alden, one of the NSA student interns who developed the jet fuel 
supply chain model, to create a second, simpler model that expands on barge operations 
from the original jet fuel supply chain model. The barge model explores potential risk 
associated with a second possible cyber threat attacking the navigation systems on the 
barge that transports fuel from DSFP Baltimore to DFSP Anacostia. The barge is only a 
small part of the end-to-end supply chain model, but creating a tailored model for it in 
MP allows more in-depth analysis on its role and functions. The behavior model for the 
intended operation of the barge contains these two nodes with corresponding events:  
1. DFSP Baltimore – Send barge to DFSP Anacostia 
2. Barge – Leaves for DFSP Anacostia, arrives at DFSP Anacostia 
Like in the end-to-end model, there is also a cyber threat in the barge model that 
could detract from mission accomplishment, but it has “no impact” in this step so the 
barge operates as intended. Figure 6 shows the tailored MP model for the intended 
operation of the barge. The Appendix Section B contains the code for this model.  
 
Figure 6. MP Model of the Intended Operation of the Barge (Scope 1, 
Trace 3). 
Step 2 of the Moebius methodology introduces negative alternatives to the 
intended operation of the barge. Figure 6 provides the baseline model to confirm the 
system works as intended before introducing any negative impacts.  
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3. Modeling Supply Chain Attributes  
One of the benefits of MP is its ability to visualize both the flow of action within 
a node, and the relationships among nodes in the supply chain. This context allows the 
observer to understand various aspects of the supply chain in one view. The visual 
depiction of the MP model can communicate: 
• Order and precedence (i.e., what comes first, next) 
• Cause and effect (i.e., which actions cause which impacts) 
• People and places (i.e., who is involved, where do things take place) 
• Behavior attributes of the system (i.e., how long events take, how much 
events cost, how many people are required for each event, etc.) 
The addition of behavior attributes in the model provides deeper insight into how 
the system works. For example, assume decision makers are interested in the impact of a 
cyber-attack on the amount of time it takes to send fuel from the U.S. petroleum industry 
to JBA because delays in fuel delivery could cause fuel shortages and impact jet 
availability for USAF missions. Per the Moebius methodology, Step 1 would establish 
the baseline for how long the supply chain takes to transport fuel to JBA when the system 
operates as intended. Modelers can create a timetable in MP and assign values to the 
duration of each event to calculate how long fuel spends at each node. Then, modelers 
can create a bar chart based on the timetable to visualize the timeline for fuel 
transportation through the supply chain. Figure 7 shows the MP display after adding the 
code for a timetable to the baseline model. The MP code is included in the model in the 
Appendix Section A. The timeline uses notional values for the duration of each event. 
Expert input could improve the accuracy of the timeline, or add additional attributes for 
cost or other specific impacts, but notional values for time are sufficient here to 
demonstrate the functionality MP has for modeling specific behavior attributes as part of 




Figure 7. MP Model of the Intended Operation of the Jet Fuel Supply 
Chain with Timeline (Scope 1, Trace 1). Source: Alden et al. 
(2020).  
The timeline bar chart provides more context on how the supply chain works, and 
it can identify interdependencies in the supply chain. For example, in Figure 7, the bar 
chart contains a yellow bar for each node in the supply chain that shows the total amount 
of time jet fuel spends at that node. There are also yellow and grey bars under each node 
that correspond to the events at that node. The yellow in the event bars depicts the length 
of time the specific event takes. The grey in the bars depicts the total time that node must 
wait for other nodes to complete their actions before starting its own operations. The last 
two bars in the chart depict the total time it takes for jet fuel to flow through the supply 
chain. If the supply chain operates as intended, it takes 35 days to send Jet A fuel from 
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the U.S. petroleum industry, convert it to F-24 military grade fuel, and send it to JBA. 
This baseline, and any deviation from it as a result of a cyber-attack, provide insight into 
specific behavior attributes of the system that may be of interest to decision makers. In 
addition to timelines, decision makers might want to explore the cost of each event or 
how many people are required for each event. MP has the flexibility to incorporate a 
variety of behavior attributes to improve understanding of system operations and 
different elements of risk.  
B. STEP 2: ADD NEGATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE OPERATION 
After establishing the model for the intended operation of the supply chain, the 
next step is to add negative alternatives; in other words, to add events that cause the 
supply chain to work not as intended. The two use cases in Step 1—the end-to-end jet 
fuel supply chain model and the barge model—included a cyber threat that had no impact 
on intended operations. This section assigns negative events to the cyber threat in each of 
the use cases in the form of a cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline and a cyber-attack on 
the barge navigation systems, respectively. It concludes with examples of other potential 
cyber threats that could impact the intended operation of the jet fuel supply chain.  
1. Cyber-Attack on the Colonial Pipeline   
In Step 2, the modeler adds the negative action of hacking the pressure control 
system of the Colonial Pipeline to the cyber threat in the jet fuel supply chain. They also 
add the potential impacts of the attack: the Pipeline bursts, the transportation of fuel halts 
until the Pipeline is repaired, and the Pipeline receives either light damage shown in 
Figure 8, medium damage shown in Figure 9, or heavy damage shown in Figure 10. The 
next step in the Moebius methodology assigns risk attributes to each event so decision 




Figure 8. MP Model of Cyber Attack Creating Light Damage to the 




Figure 9. MP Model of Cyber Attack Creating Medium Damage to the 
Colonial Pipeline (Scope 1, Trace 3). Source: Alden et al. (2020). 
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Figure 10. MP Model of Cyber Attack Creating Heavy Damage to the 
Colonial Pipeline (Scope 1, Trace 4). Source: Alden et al. (2020). 
As with the model of the intended operations of the supply chain, the MP models 
with negative alternatives in Figures 8, 9, and 10 help visualize the flow of action within 
a node and the relationships among nodes in the supply chain. The models depict how a 
cyber-attack influences order and precedence, cause and effect, people and places, and 
with the bar charts included, timelines for the system’s operations. The next chapter 
describes the results of this model in more detail.  
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2. Cyber-Attack on the Barge 
In the model the author created to assess the risk of a second possible cyber threat 
attacking the navigation systems on the barge, two potential negative alternatives could 
occur: the attack either delays or sinks the barge. Figure 11 shows the scenario where the 
cyber-attack delays the barge. Figure 12 shows the scenario where the cyber-attack sinks 
the barge. The Appendix, Section B contains the MP code for this model. 
 
Figure 11. MP Model of a Cyber Attack Delaying the Barge (Scope 1, Trace 
1). 
 
Figure 12. MP Model of a Cyber Attack Sinking the Barge (Scope 1, Trace 
2). 
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The cyber-attack introduces new events in the model under the barge node: 
navigation systems are hacked, barge delayed, and barge sunk. The model helps visualize 
how the flow of action changes within and across nodes as a result of the attack.  
3. Other Potential Cyber Threats 
The MP model can facilitate brainstorming the various ways cyber threats could 
impact the supply chain because one can see the various nodes and events that are 
essential for mission accomplishment. Moebius recommends moving systematically 
through each actor and event in the system to identify the negative alternatives to include 
in the model (Moebius 2018, 16). Doing this for the jet fuel supply chain use case, one 
could brainstorm a variety of potential cyber vulnerabilities, such as 
• An attack on the software that orders fuel, which could result in JBA 
receiving not enough or too much fuel 
• An attack on the software that manages barge scheduling or contracting, 
which could cause confusion and delay the barge 
• An attack on the software or machines that provide fuel additives to 
convert Jet A fuel into military grade fuel, which could result in the wrong 
fuel mixture being sent to JBA 
• An attack on the fuel quality sensors, which could prevent the 
identification of bad fuel at JBA, cause jets to receive bad fuel, and result 
in engines stalling out or corroding over time 
This thesis focuses on applying the steps of the Moebius methodology to just the 
Colonial Pipeline and barge cyber-attacks for simplicity, but one could add more negative 
alternatives to the model or create separate models to explore different threats of interest. 
The ability to scale the number of alternatives in the model is one of the useful features of 
MP because it allows modelers to easily expand or contract their focus based on decision 
maker priorities or interest areas. It is important to have agreement on the intended 
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operation of the system, which negative alternatives to include, and the expected 
operation of those alternatives before assigning risk attributes. 
C. STEPS 3–5: ADD RISK ATTRIBUTES AND CALCULATE OR ASSIGN 
IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD VALUES  
After completing the behavioral model, the next three steps of Moebius’ 
methodology add attributes for risk in the form of likelihood and impact, and assign 
values to these attributes in the model. The Moebius methodology provides flexibility in 
choosing how to measure likelihood and impact in the model (Moebius 2018, 17). This 
section creates the likelihood values for the cyber-attack use cases, then it demonstrates 
two possible ways to model impact in MP: assessing multiple levels of a single type of 
impact using the example of schedule impact from the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack; 
and modeling multiple types of impacts using a single value, or consequence factor, with 
examples from the barge cyber-attack. The section concludes by assigning values for 
impact and likelihood for both use cases in MP.  
1. Likelihood Values 
In the simple model for calculating risk, likelihood is a single value that 
represents both the likelihood of the attack occurring and the likelihood of the associated 
impacts occurring because of the attack (Smith and Merritt 2017, 21). Table 2 shows the 
likelihood values this thesis uses. The values range between zero, representing not likely 
to happen, and one, representing 90–100 percent likely to happen. There are only a 
handful of values available for the likelihood value to prevent decision makers from 
arguing over small differences (Smith and Merritt 2017, 79). 
Table 1. Likelihood Values for Cyber-Attack Use Cases 
Likelihood Value Percent Likely to Occur 
0 Not likely to occur 
0.2 1-29% likely to occur 
0.4 30-49% likely to occur 
0.6 50-69% likely to occur 
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Likelihood Value Percent Likely to Occur 
0.8 70-89% likely to occur 
1 90-100% likely to occur 
 
Expert input or analysis would be the ideal source for assigning likelihood to the 
scenarios, but this thesis must draw from publicly available information, so the values in 
Table 1 are hypothetical ranges. Also, despite the numerical scale, the values are 
qualitative; they should not imply precision of measurement, especially in the risk 
calculations that add and multiply the values in subsequent steps.  
2. Measuring Multiple Levels of Impact  
MP offers several different options for measuring impact in the model. One way 
is by assessing how a specific behavior attribute changes as a result of different events 
occurring in the model. Consider the example of how long it takes fuel to flow through 
the jet fuel supply chain.  
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 showed the MP model for the end-to-end jet fuel supply 
chain as it is intended to operate and how it would operate after a cyber-attack on the 
Colonial Pipeline causes light, medium, or heavy damage, respectively. The bar charts 
embedded in the figures reflect values assigned in the model code to quantify the impact 
of a cyber-attack on the total number of days JBA would not receive jet fuel due to 
damage to the Colonial Pipeline. Figure 13 shows those bar charts side-by-side for ease 
of comparison.  
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Figure 13. Comparison of the Range of Impacts on the Jet Fuel Supply 
Chain from a Cyber-Attack on the Colonial Pipeline. Source: 
Alden et al. (2020). 
When the Pipeline operates as intended, Figure 13 shows it takes 20 days for fuel 
to transit the Pipeline. This duration appears in the intended operation bar chart under the 
bar titled send_fuel_through_pipeline, and in the other charts in the bar titled 
resend_fuel_through_pipeline. A cyber-attack on the Pipeline halts the flow of fuel until 
the Pipeline can be repaired. While the number of days to repair the Pipeline varies in 
each scenario, all scenarios assume JBA stops receiving fuel eight days after the cyber-
attack occurs. The blue bar in each chart shows how many days JBA is without fuel as a 
result of the cyber-attack. For example, a cyber-attack with light damage takes notionally 
three days to repair. The Pipeline must then resend the jet fuel, which takes 20 days. 
Subsequent steps result in fuel taking a total of 32 days to transit from the Pipeline to 
JBA. Altogether, a cyber-attack with light damage results in a notional 24-day pause in 
JBA receiving jet fuel. An attack with medium damage notionally requires a six-day 
repair time, which causes a 27-day pause in JBA receiving jet fuel. An attack with heavy 
damage notionally causes a nine-day repair time, resulting in a 30-day pause in JBA 
receiving jet fuel.  
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The bar charts produced by the model allow decision makers to compare different 
levels of impact that could result from a cyber-attack. The bar charts display both the gap 
in time without fuel and the contributing factors underpinning those gaps. This insight 
can help decision makers develop different mitigation strategies. For example, MP shows 
that the degree of damage to the Pipeline results in different lengths of repair time, and 
those repair times result in different timelines for fuel stoppage at JBA. With that insight, 
decision makers can explore at least two paths for mitigations: mitigating the gap in fuel 
delivery, perhaps by keeping additional fuel reserves on base; and mitigating the root 
cause of the gap by finding ways to accelerate repair or replace time for the barge. MP 
not only helps visualize magnitude of impact, but it also helps decision makers 
understand contributing factors, which can better inform mitigation strategies.  
3. Measuring Multiple Types of Impact  
Schedule impact is only one type of impact a cyber-attack can have. The real-life 
cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline cost the Pipeline owners more than $4 million in 
ransom fees, and it impacted mission accomplishment by preventing citizens from 
obtaining the gas they needed to commute to work, reach goods and services, and enjoy 
recreation beyond walking distances. When multiple types of impacts could occur, 
decision makers must choose which aspects of impact they want to assess in the model.  
If decision makers are interested in assessing more than one type of impact from a 
cyber-attack, one could create multiple models for the different types of impacts. 
Alternatively, Smith and Merritt (2017) provide several different techniques for 
calculating impact. One method they present creates a consequence factor, which is a 
single, dimensionless value that represents the presence of several impacts, a range of 
impacts, or both (Smith and Merritt 2017, 78). A consequence factor by itself can mask 
the underlying elements that contribute to risk, so it is important to provide transparency 
into the contributing elements via a table, diagram, or other description. It is also 
important, when aggregating impacts, to calibrate the factor to ensure reasonably 
consistent impacts across the different variables (Smith and Merritt 2017, 77). A 
consequence factor can be beneficial because it establishes agreed-upon trade-off rules 
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among different stakeholders (Smith and Merritt 2017, 28); for example, how decision 
makers should collectively value the relationship among cost, schedule, and performance 
impacts. By incorporating ranges of impact, the consequence factor can also prevent 
arguments over magnitude differences that do not matter (Smith and Merritt 2017, 29). It 
can be difficult to establish such a factor because it requires stakeholder consensus. 
Additionally, the numerical value of the consequence factor is not the same as a 
quantitative scale, so decision makers must be aware of how the factor translates into 
tangible impacts, especially when calculating and interpreting risk (Smith and Merritt 
2017, 79–80). This thesis uses a consequence factor to measure the collective impact of a 
cyber-attack on cost, schedule, and performance elements of the jet fuel supply chain.  
A consequence factor helps assess the multiple impacts a cyber-attack can cause. 
Consider the barge use case. The impact to schedule, cost, and mission performance are 
all relevant and important: if the barge is delayed or sunk, DOD could experience late 
fuel arrival, costs associated with replacing fuel lost on the sunk barge, and a reduction in 
the number of mission-capable jets available to defend the National Capital Region 
(NCR) due to fuel shortages. Instead of modeling and calculating these risks separately, a 
consequence factor helps understand the compound impact from schedule, cost, and 
mission performance.  
Table 2 outlines the consequence factors this thesis uses to measure impact in the 
risk assessment. The table provides transparency into the cost, schedule, and performance 
elements that underpin the consequence factor. Similar to the likelihood values, there are 
only a handful of values available for the consequence factor to prevent decision makers 
from arguing over small differences (Smith and Merritt 2017, 79). These values range in 
odd increments from one to nine, representing lowest to highest impact, based on the 
expected cost, schedule, and performance impact of a barge delay or total loss. The data 
in Table 2 assume:  
• There are 21 F-16 fighter aircraft in the 113th Wing on JBA (Heaton 
2010).  
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• Each F-16 aircraft can carry 12,000 pounds (1,500 gallons) of fuel (U.S. 
Air Force 2015). 
• Jet A fuel costs about $1.93 per gallon in North America (IATA 2021). 
• The cost to refuel each F-16 aircraft is about $2,895 (1,500 gallons 
multiplied by $1.93 per gallon). 
• The cost to refuel all fighter jets in the 113th Wing is about $60,795 
($2,895 per aircraft multiplied by 21 aircraft in the Wing). 
• Not all the Wing’s fighter jets need to be refueled at once because they 
support training and combat deployment missions in addition to standing 
alert to protect the NCR (Church 2012).  
• It takes about 20 hours for a barge to go from Baltimore to Anacostia 
based on a 175 nautical mile trip from Baltimore, M.D. to Washington, 
D.C., (Cape Charles n.d.) and expected operating speed of a tugboat of 
about nine knots (Weeks Marine 2021).  
• The cost for an additional barge to replace a delayed or sunk barge is 
about $7,620 (the approximate rate to move 88 metric tons of fuel (1,500 
gallons per aircraft, multiplied by 21 aircraft in the Wing, divided by 358 
gallons per metric ton) in the New York to Norfolk water corridor (Merlin 
Petroleum 2021). 
• Costs associated with an attack on the Colonial Pipeline relate primarily to 
increased fuel prices that could result from the Pipeline being damaged 
and offline. For example, if Jet A fuel cost $2.50 per gallon, instead of 
$1.93 per gallon, the cost to refuel all the fighter jets in the 113th Wing 
would be $78,750. DOD would not fund repair of the Colonial Pipeline 
itself.  
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• Building upon the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack use case, after eight 
days, JBA stops receiving fuel, so risk to schedule and mission 
performance is highest at, after, and leading up to an eight-day gap. 
• All estimates for cost, schedule, and mission performance are notional, 
based on publicly available and often dated information, and would 
improve substantially if updated with expert input. For the purposes of this 
thesis, notional data are sufficient to demonstrate the functionality and 
benefits of using MP to model risk.  
Table 2. Impact: Consequence Factors for Cyber-Attack Use Cases 
Factor Cost Impact Schedule Impact Performance Impact 
1 <$10,000 <1 day delay >85% jets are mission capable 
3 $10,000 - $20,000 1-2 day delay 66-85% of jets are mission capable 
5 $20,000 - $30,000 3-5 day delay 46-65% jets are mission capable 
7 $30,000 – $50,000 6-8 day delay 25-45% jets are mission capable 
9 >$50,000 >8 day delay <25% jets are mission capable 
 
4. Assigning Likelihood and Impact to the Use Cases 
To calculate risk, each cyber-attack scenario receives a single value for likelihood 
and a single value for impact. Table 3 and Table 4 outline the likelihood and impact 
values for the two use cases in this thesis. The value for impact comes from the mean 
average of the individual consequence factors for cost, schedule, and performance. Table 
3 shows the likelihood and impact assigned to the potential outcomes of the cyber-attack 
on the Colonial Pipeline. The most likely scenarios involving the Colonial Pipeline are 
cyber-attacks that require the Pipeline to repair light or medium damage. The scenarios 
where the Pipeline must repair medium or heavy damage have the highest impact factors 
of the outcomes in this use case.  
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Do nothing 0.2 1 1 1 1 0.2 
Repair 
light damage 0.8 7 9 7 7 5.6 
Repair medium 
damage 0.8 9 9 7 9 7.2 
Repair heavy 
damage 0.6 9 9 9 9 5.4 
 
Table 4 shows the likelihood and impact assigned to the potential outcomes of the 
cyber-attack on the barge. The most likely scenario involving the barge is a cyber-attack 
that delays the barge. The delayed barge and the sunk barge share the highest impact 
factor of the outcomes in that use case.  
Table 4. Likelihood, Impact, and Risk for Barge Cyber-Attack Use Case 
Event & 
Outcome Likelihood 











No impact 0.2 1 1 1 1 0.2 
Barge delayed 0.8 7 5 3 5 4 
Barge sunk 0.2 9 3 3 5 1 
 
Using a risk table, like Table 3 and Table 4, is useful at this stage for both the 
modeler and the decision maker. The risk tables provide transparency into the values 
underpinning each potential outcome of the use case. They also help modelers and 
decision makers visualize all the risk attribute values in one place and confirm the values 
before inputting them into the MP model. Once the values are in MP, SAY statements 
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can display these values alongside the sequence diagram that shows the context of the 
supply chain. The modeler can then compare the SAY statements to the risk tables to 
check the accuracy of the MP calculations and ensure the model is producing expected 
results.  
5. Modeling Likelihood and Impact in MP 
The final action to complete Steps 3–5 in the Moebius methodology is to write the 
MP code that assigns the values from Table 3 and Table 4 to attributes for likelihood and 
impact for each of the use case outcomes in the model. Figure 14 contains this MP code, 
extracted from the full model in the Appendix Section C. The ATTRIBUTES designation 
in the MP schema creates number variables for likelihood and impact, as well as for four 
variables (trace_risk_score, sum_risk_scores, max_risk_score, and 
max_risk_trace_unique_number) that the global calculation uses in Step 6. The 
COORDINATE statements in the MP schema assign likelihood and impact values 
according to those in Table 3 and Table 4.  
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Figure 14. MP Code for Likelihood and Impact Attributes. 
For completeness, Table 3 and Table 4 also show the risk score for each potential 
outcome, calculated by multiplying the values for likelihood and the final impact factor, 
but that calculation takes place in part of Step 6 in the Moebius methodology. The next 
section discusses the risk calculation in more detail. 
D. STEP 6: USE IMPACT AND LIKELIHOOD TO CALCULATE, QUERY, 
AND SORT RISK 
In Step 6, the Moebius methodology again gives decision makers flexibility by 
allowing them to choose their preferred way of mathematically calculating risk (Moebius 
2018, 17). This flexibility is helpful because decision makers can calculate risk in the 
way most meaningful to their use case, and it allows this thesis to extend this step of the 
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Moebius methodology to include a global risk report in MP. This thesis calculates risk for 
each use case by multiplying the value for likelihood with the value for impact (i.e., the 
final consequence factor) per Table 3 and Table 4. To calculate the total risk in a model, 
this thesis adds together the risk scores for each use case in the model.  
This section describes two examples of calculating risk in MP: a simple example 
using the barge cyber-attack, and a more complex example combining the Colonial 
Pipeline cyber-attack and the barge cyber-attack into one model to show how MP can 
calculate risk when there are two threats to the supply chain. Both examples generate a 
global report to assess risk across all the traces in the model. The addition of the global 
report extends Step 6 of the Moebius methodology. As a result, the title for this step is 
now, “Use Impact and Likelihood to Calculate, Query, and Sort Risk,” instead of 
Moebius’ original title, “Use Impact and Likelihood to Calculate Risk.”  
1. Simple Risk Calculation: Barge Cyber-Attack 
The MP code for calculating risk as the product of likelihood and impact is quite 
simple. Figure 15 shows the MP code to display values for likelihood and impact, and 
calculate the risk score, for the barge cyber-attack use case. The full code for this MP 
model appears in the Appendix Section B. The COORDINATE statement tells the model 
to look in each trace for the key events in blue: no_impact, barge_delayed, and 
barge_sunk. If the trace contains any of these events, the SAY statements tell the model 
to display the words in orange and their values on the sequence diagram. The SAY 
statement for “Risk Score” tells MP to calculate the risk score as the product of the event 
likelihood and impact and then display that value on the sequence diagram.  
 
Figure 15. MP Code to Calculate and Display the Risk Score. 
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Figures 16, 17, and 18 show the model results and display the risk score and the 
values for likelihood and impact using the values in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
Figure 16. Cyber-Attack Has No Impact (Scope 1, Trace 3). 
 
Figure 17. Cyber-Attack Delays the Barge (Scope 1, Trace 1). 
 
Figure 18. Cyber-Attack Sinks the Barge (Scope 1, Trace 2). 
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For this simple use case, with a small number of potential scenario outcomes and 
single values for likelihood and impact, MP generates only three traces. Manually 
reviewing the figures and ordering the traces by highest to lowest risk does not take much 
time. The scenario with highest risk is a cyber-attack that delays the barge (risk score of 
four), followed by a cyber-attack that sinks the barge (risk score of one), then a cyber-
attack with no impact (risk score of 0.2). In more complex models, sorting and ordering 
becomes more difficult, so having an automated way to identify and categorize the traces 
could help humans focus on the traces that are most relevant to their areas of interest.  
The global report provides this automation. This thesis is the first time the global 
report function has ever been applied to assessing risk. Figure 19 shows the MP code in 
the global section of the model for the cyber-attack on the barge. The code uses the 
attributes of likelihood, impact, trace_risk_score, sum_risk_scores, max_risk_score, and 
max_risk_trace_unique_number from Figure 14. It tells MP to perform several tasks: 
• Query Risk Across Scenarios to Enable Sorting: Identify the maximum 
risk score (GLOBAL.max_risk.score) by going through each trace and 
comparing risk scores. If the current trace is higher than the last trace, 
update the maximum risk score to equal the highest value. Pull the number 
of the trace for the highest risk score 
(GLOBAL.max_risk_trace_unique_number) for inclusion in the global 
report. Mark all traces that have a risk score higher than a specific value 
(in this case, >=2) so the modeler can take advantage of the sort option in 
MP to have the marked traces appear at the top of the trace column. 
• Calculate Total Risk: Add all the risk scores (GLOBAL.sum_risk.scores) 
to determine the total risk associated with the use case.  
• Calculate Average Risk: Add all the risk scores and divide by number of 
traces (GLOBAL.sum_risk.scores/#$$TRACES) to determine the average 
risk across all use cases. 
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• Create and Display a Global Risk Report: State the title for the risk 
report and report the scope of the model. As part of the display, present the 
information in the SAY statements, including total risk across total 
number of traces, highest risk, average risk, and a direction to sort traces 
by those marked first.  
Sort is a standard feature in MP. The menu is directly above the global report and 
it allows the user to sort event traces by those marked, by event number, or by 
probability. Probability in this case is not the same as the likelihood value in the model. 
Instead, it refers to the probability of the model generating a specific trace (Auguston 
2020, 58). Modelers can assign specific conditions for event probability in the model; 
however, that feature of MP is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Figure 19. MP Code for the Global Section with a Single Cyber Threat. 
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Figure 20 displays the model generated by adding the MP code in Figure 19. The 
global view with the global report appears in the top right corner of the model, above the 
list of traces MP generates. Traces are sorted with those marked appearing first.  
 
Figure 20. Global View in Upper-Right of MP Display for the Barge Cyber-
Attack. 
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In Figure 20, the first trace is the only trace marked. It has an orange circle next to 
the trace number, which indicates the risk score is at or above the risk score threshold of 
two. No other traces were marked, so they have a risk score less than two. Two is an 
arbitrary number, chosen simply because it is the next highest whole number closest to 
the average risk across the traces (1.73). The modeler can easily change this number 
based on decision-maker risk tolerance or to support other view preferences. The purpose 
of the mark is so one can quickly determine which traces meet a risk tolerance level that 
is worth further investigation. In this case, the first trace is the only trace with above-
average risk. The global report indicates the first trace is also the one with the highest risk 
score, so decision makers may want to discuss mitigations for this scenario—the cyber-
attack that delays the barge—as a priority. The global view helps users quickly focus on 
and prioritize the scenarios of highest interest; then, users can click through the other 
traces to explore the other results.  
2. Risk Calculation with Two Threats: Combined Attack Model 
The automated calculations and display generated by the global report become 
increasingly useful when assessing risk in more complex use cases that generate 
numerous traces. Assume a decision maker has limited resources to invest in cyber 
security and wants to understand how to best allocate those resources to improve the 
security of the jet fuel supply chain. They need to assess and compare risk across multiple 
scenarios from multiple threats. To demonstrate this capability in MP, the author 
combined the MP models for the cyber-attack on the barge and the cyber-attack on the 
Colonial Pipeline. Figure 21 displays the resulting two-threat model using the scenario 
for its intended operation (i.e., each cyber threat has no impact on the intended operations 
of the supply chain). The code for this model appears in the Appendix Section C.  
Figure 22 condenses the view from Figure 21 by hiding the nodes for DFSP 
Anacostia and JBA since there is no change to the events or impact at those nodes 
compared to scenarios included in earlier chapters of this thesis. MP allows the modeler 
to comment out this section of code to remove it from the display but keep it in the 
model. This technique preserves the completeness of the end-to-end supply chain model, 
49 
while simplifying information for decision makers so they can focus on only the aspects 
of the supply chain that are impacted by active cyber threats. The flexibility of MP allows 
modelers to customize the visual presentation for their audience while preserving the 
complete context of the system and its behavior.  
 
Figure 21. MP Model of Two Cyber Threats to the Jet Fuel Supply Chain 
(Scope 1, Trace 12). 
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Figure 22. Condensed MP Model with Two Cyber Threats to the Jet Fuel 
Pipeline (Scope 1, Trace 12). 
The MP model with two cyber threats includes the same outcomes and associated 
likelihood and impact factors for the Colonial Pipeline and barge cyber-attacks described 
in Table 3, Table 4, and Figure 14. It also includes a global report similar to that 
contained in the barge model in Figure 19; however, the presence of multiple threats in 
the model requires an adjusted approach to calculating and querying risk. Figure 23 
shows the MP code in the global section of the model with two cyber threats. There are 
two differences in this model compared to the model that had only one cyber threat: 
• Multiple Variables to Calculate Risk: The two-threat model includes 
two different variables—one for each use case—to calculate risk. There is 
an outer COORDINATE function (COORDINATE $y) to calculate risk 
across the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack use case, and an inner 
COORDINATE function (COORDINATE $z) to calculate risk across the 
barge cyber-attack use case. Including a separate variable for each use 
case allows the model to calculate and display the risk associated with that 
use case, as well as perform a separate calculation for the total risk to the 
supply chain from both cyber threats.  
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• Trace_Risk_Score: Because there are multiple risk calculations, the two-
threat model introduces a new attribute, trace_risk_score, which adds 
together the risk from each use case to generate the total risk to the supply 
chain from both cyber threats. Trace_risk_score replaces the risk variable 
($y.likelihood*$y.impact) where it appeared in the global report section of 
the simple model. A simple model with only one cyber threat, like the 
barge cyber-attack, has the option of using the trace_risk_score variable or 
directly calculating risk ($y.likelihood*$y.impact). Once the number of 
threats is greater than one, using trace_risk_score is how MP knows to 
store the results of the risk calculations from different threats separately 
when they appear in the same trace. That way, decision makers can 
compare the risk across different threats.  
Apart from these two changes, the two-threat model functions as previously 
described: it marks traces above a certain threshold value and issues a risk report that 
contains the total risk across the total number of traces, highest risk, average risk, and a 
direction to sort traces by those marked first. 
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Figure 23. MP Code for the Global Section with Two Cyber Threats. 
Before discussing this use case further, it is important to note two limitations of 
this model: it is not scalable to more than two threats, and it requires the “y” and “z” 
events specified in the nested COORDINATE statements to appear only once in each 
trace and be mutually exclusive. The two cyber threats in the jet fuel supply chain use 
case meet these conditions, so the model is accurate; however, more complex models that 
contain more than two threats or the iteration of one or more processes need a different 
approach to calculating risk. An example of an alternative approach is in the Appendix 
Section D. It produces the same results as the MP code in Figure 23, but is scalable to 
more than two threats and processes with iterative steps. The model limitations and the 
adjusted code in Section D evolved while validating the model. It would be beneficial to 
further test and validate this code on use cases with more than two threats; however, that 
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is outside the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of demonstrating the ability of MP to 
help decision makers assess, visualize, and prioritize cyber threats, this thesis will use the 
two-threat model in Figure 23. Figure 24 shows the visualization generated by that MP 
code, including the global report and the trace with the highest risk. 
 
Figure 24. Highest Risk Trace in Model with Two Cyber Threats (Scope 1, 
Trace 4). 
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The jet fuel supply chain model with two cyber threats shown in Figure 24 
produced a total of 12 traces, four times more than the barge model, which had only one 
cyber threat and produced three traces. As the number of threats or potential scenario 
outcomes increases, it becomes harder to manually sort through the results of the model 
to identify the traces of greatest interest. The global report is especially useful in these 
more complex models because it calls attention to the traces that meet a specific threshold 
for risk. For example, at the top right of the screen, the global risk report indicates the 
trace with the highest risk is trace four with a risk score of 11.2. After sorting by marked 
traces, one can quickly find trace four and see the sequence diagram that explains the 
scenario: a cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline required repairs to medium damage and 
a cyber-attack on the barge navigation systems delayed the barge. Together, these events 
create the highest risk to the supply chain’s intended operations.  
To see how other scenarios compared to the one with highest risk, decision 
makers can go back to the list of sorted traces. The list quickly shows there are only two 
other traces with a risk score of nine or higher. Nine was the threshold for marking traces 
in this model because, on the first run of the model, seven of the 12 total traces generated 
had a risk score higher than the 6.34 average. After stratifying the total risk from highest 
to lowest across those seven traces (11.2, 9.6, 9.4, 8.2, 7.4, 6.6, 6.4), revising the 
threshold to nine reduced the number of scenarios to explore in the initial review. 
Changing the threshold value for marking took only a few seconds to update in the code, 
re-run, and display. The agility of MP to respond so quickly to updates in the model is a 
key benefit of the tool. It could even allow decision makers to run excursions in the 
meeting room, if desired, and avoid unnecessarily postponing decisions to a later meeting 
just to make simple changes to model assumptions. 
The global report adds additional analytic capability to risk assessment in MP, 
and it extends the Moebius methodology by providing decision makers an automated way 
to summarize, compare, and sort the results of multiple traces. This is especially useful in 
more complex models that have multiple cyber threats and generate numerous traces that 
take humans more time to evaluate than machines. With risk calculated, queried, and 
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sorted in this extended Step 6, there is only one more step to complete the methodology: 
displaying results to decision makers.  
E. STEP 7: OUTPUT DESIRED FORMAT OF RISK FOR DECISION 
MAKER 
The Moebius methodology allows modelers to tailor how to communicate risk to 
decision makers so it best meets their needs (Moebius 2018, 18). The literature review of 
this thesis explored traditional ways DOD displays risk—in a risk table, risk map, or risk 
matrix—and how features in MP improve upon those traditional displays. The sequence 
diagram in MP, timetables, SAY statements, and global report provide useful 
visualizations of risk that decision makers can easily understand and interact with in real 
time. This section uses the two-threat cyber-attack model to discuss the benefits of 
sharing MP visualizations directly with decision makers.  
The visualization of the two-threat MP model, shown in Figure 24, is an 
information-rich but easy to understand display. The sequence diagram shows the context 
of how the jet fuel supply chain functions by describing the key nodes and events in the 
supply chain. It helps decision makers visualize exactly where the cyber-attack is coming 
from, what nodes it impacts, and what events it causes. Displaying the sequence diagram 
to decision makers ensures they have a shared understanding of how the system works 
and the various scenarios that introduce risk. This baseline of understanding can be 
helpful at overcoming organization stovepipes, especially when bringing together 
decision makers from different organizations with varying levels of knowledge about the 
system. Additionally, decision makers can be confident the various scenarios represent all 
possible outcomes within the model scope, so there are no unknown risks they might be 
missing. 
The global report on the top right of Figure 24 displays the total risk and the 
average risk across all scenarios. If decision makers had to choose how to prioritize risk 
among multiple supply chains—such as jet fuel, parts, food, people, or more—they 
would be able to quickly compare the global reports from each supply chain model in 
MP. The global report also identifies the risk threshold for marking traces. Once sorted, 
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decision makers can quickly see across the 12 possible scenarios that MP identified only 
three traces with risk higher than nine. As they explore those three highest-risk traces 
first, they would see from the sequence diagram that all three scenarios included a cyber-
attack on the Colonial Pipeline, but only two of the three traces included a cyber-attack 
on the barge navigation systems that had an impact. These results could suggest the 
vulnerability of the Colonial Pipeline to cyber-attack presents greater risk to the jet fuel 
supply chain than the vulnerability of the barge to cyber-attack. If limited resources are 
available to mitigate vulnerabilities in the supply chain, decision makers could choose to 
prioritize mitigations that reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack on the Colonial 
Pipeline over mitigations for the barge.  
If decision makers are uncomfortable basing a mitigation strategy on only the 
three highest risk scenarios, modelers can easily change the threshold for marking traces 
and quickly rerun the model. Decision makers could then see additional scenarios for 
how one or both cyber-attacks impact the supply chain. Alternatively, if decision makers 
have “what if” questions that require changing likelihood or impact values, modelers can 
easily update the MP code and quickly rerun the model to demonstrate the impact of the 
change.  
Using MP for both analyzing and displaying information to decision makers 
offers additional context and insight compared to traditional tools like the risk table, risk 
map, and risk matrix. Decision makers will likely need a variety of different visuals to 
support their assessment and prioritization of risk, but the displays MP provides offer rich 
context and insight on the system and potential risks. MP provides a common framework 
for understanding how the jet fuel supply chain works, transparency into the thinking and 
data underpinning the risk assessments, an exhaustive set of scenarios with risks from 
cyber-attack, and an agile tool that can address “what if” questions easily and quickly. 
These features of MP allow decision makers to have more substantive debate on, or 






The research question this thesis sought to answer was how can decision makers 
use MP to assess, visualize, and prioritize cyber risk in a supply chain? This section 
summarizes the conclusions of this research and identifies areas that would benefit from 
additional research.  
There are four main conclusions of this research. First, the Moebius methodology 
(2018) is repeatable and extendable. There is enough rigor in the methodology to guide a 
modeler through using MP to assess risk, and enough flexibility for the modeler to tailor 
the model variables, risk calculations, and display output to their use case and decision-
maker needs. This thesis successfully applied the Moebius methodology to a supply chain 
use case and built models for single-threat and two-threat use cases. It also extended the 
methodology by modifying the global report to support risk assessment for the first time, 
including using new calculations for total risk, average risk, and a risk threshold for 
marking traces.  
Second, MP allows decision makers to achieve and assess a common 
understanding of how the supply chain works end-to-end, and how cyber threats could 
impact different aspects of the supply chain. This thesis demonstrated a model for a 
cyber-attack that disrupted the entire supply chain. That model included a timeline to 
understand the impact of an attack on fuel delivery gaps at JBA. This thesis also dissected 
a single part of the supply chain—the barge—to understand the risk from a cyber-attack 
to operations in that specific part of the supply chain. The simple barge model 
demonstrated the utility of being able to break down a complex system into smaller parts 
to facilitate better understanding of how various nodes function, interact, and change as 
the result of adding negative alternatives. This thesis also included a model with two 
cyber threats to the supply chain to understand the risk associated with different 
combinations of cyber-attacks.  
MP has the capability and capacity to support risk assessments on broad and 
narrow aspects of the supply chain, so modelers can tailor their work in MP to explore 
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the areas of greatest interest to decision makers. Tailoring the model can help decision 
makers resolve differences in knowledge, assumptions, and perspectives. The model 
forces decision makers from different organizations and backgrounds to agree on a 
common definition of how the system operates and how negative alternatives might alter 
the intended operation. Creating a tailored model to explore a specific aspect of system 
behavior that decision makers might disagree on can help facilitate discussion and ideally 
resolve disagreements.  
Third, the benefit of using MP to assess risk increases as use cases grow in 
complexity. For example, consider the simple barge model, which generated only three 
scenarios in its risk assessment, compared to the two-threat model that generated 12 
potential scenarios. MP automatically generated the 12 traces in less than one minute, 
which is hours or days faster than humans could have brainstormed and created the same 
number of traces in a SysML model. Decision makers can also have confidence that the 
scenarios MP generates are exhaustive within the scope of the model, so there are no 
blind spots: the model includes all possible scenarios and not just those humans were able 
to conceptualize. Additionally, instead of manually reviewing and sorting all 12 traces, 
the global report on risk helped decision makers quickly identify the total and average 
risk across all the traces. The report marked traces with risk scores that met the user-
defined threshold level, and then the sort function in MP presented the traces by those 
marked first. The marked traces help decision makers quickly orient to the scenarios that 
met their defined threshold of interest, allowing more time for discussion on mitigation 
strategies and less time sorting through model results.  
Finally, MP provides the ability to visualize risk more comprehensively than 
existing risk assessment tools. The risk table, risk map, and risk matrix have limitations 
in how they communicate the context of the system, interdependencies among risks, 
static data that cannot be manipulated for real-time “what if” drills, and aggregate risk. 
MP has features that can overcome these limitations.  
• Context: MP gives decision makers the ability to calculate and visualize 
risk in the context of the full system, with all scope-complete scenarios 
exposed. The sequence diagram in MP helps decision makers visualize the 
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flow of events within and among the supply chain nodes and 
communicates important context about the system and its environment, 
including order and precedence, cause and effect, people and places, and 
behavior attributes like timing, cost, performance, and personnel. This 
information creates shared understanding among decision makers from 
different backgrounds on how the system operates and what factors 
generate risk to the system. A common baseline is especially helpful when 
trying to achieve agreement among decision makers from different 
organizations that have different roles in, and views of, the supply chain. 
Decision makers can use the modeling process, and the approachable 
visualizations it produces, to achieve a shared view of the situation upon 
which they can then base their debates, decisions, and justifications.  
• Interdependencies: The sequence diagram in MP also communicates 
interdependencies that exist among events and risks in the system. For 
example, the timetable bar charts created in the Colonial Pipeline model 
displayed the gap in time JBA went without fuel and the events that 
contributed to those gaps. The charts showed Pipeline repair time as the 
primary driver of the fuel delivery gap since the Pipeline required 20 days 
to reflow fuel after the repair regardless of the length of repair time. 
Decision makers could choose to prioritize mitigations that reduce repair 
time or those that give JBA access to an alternative supply of fuel since 
they cannot shorten the 20-day fuel transit time through the Pipeline. 
Understanding interdependencies can help decision makers develop 
different mitigation strategies, perhaps prioritizing contributing factors 
that address the root cause of a vulnerability over addressing more visible 
symptoms of an attack.  
• Responsiveness: Too often, decision makers must delay a decision 
because the analysis underpinning the recommended course of action is 
not within the risk assessment presentation and analysts need to go back to 
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their desks to update calculations and summary charts in response to 
questions about what might occur if there were changes in certain 
assumptions or variables. With MP, modelers can easily update the 
assumptions and variables in the model and quickly rerun the simulation 
in seconds to regenerate scenarios and risk assessments. The speed of 
recalculation is so fast that MP could be used in the meeting room with 
decision makers to answer “what if” questions in real time. The interactive 
environment of MP provides a tool that could make meetings about risk 
prioritization more interactive and productive, and decisions more timely.  
• Aggregate Risk: The addition of the global report to risk assessment in 
this thesis adds more valuable information to the standard MP display. The 
global report calculates risk across all scenarios and summarizes it in a 
concise report in the top right of the MP display. This information 
includes values for aggregate risks, like total risk and average risk across 
all scenarios. 
The package of features in MP is not available in existing risk assessment 
approaches, yet analysts and decision makers are not using MP widely for risk 
assessment today. One reason may be lack of awareness. The Moebius methodology 
exists in a thesis with distribution restricted to DOD and DOD contractors only (Moebius 
2018). This thesis has unlimited distribution with the intent of sharing the Moebius 
methodology, along with the extensions to the methodology described herein. The author 
hopes this thesis will inform analysts and decision makers about the ways in which they 
can use MP models to better assess and prioritize risk, especially the risk associated with 
cyber-attack on a supply chain. To that end, the code for the single-threat and two-threat 
models used in this thesis, as well as the model in the Appendix Section D that has an 
alternative risk calculation and query approach for more complex use cases, should be 
available on the MP-Firebird website so others can reuse and improve upon the models. 
More research should also be done to expand the use and maturity of MP for risk 
assessment.  
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Modeling risk in MP, especially supply chain risk, is still nascent research. Future 
research should improve upon the quality and type of assessments MP can do, the 
visualizations it creates to support decision makers, and the ability of the modeling 
software to handle more complex use cases. Specifically, future work could develop MP 
models that incorporate more risk assessment best practices. For example, this thesis used 
the simple model for evaluating risk, which has one variable each for likelihood and 
impact. Further research could create the MP code for the standard risk model, which is a 
better estimator of risk (Smith and Merritt 2002, 25). The creation of additional MP 
models could also incorporate events with different impact measures (i.e., cost, schedule, 
and performance attributes) instead of using a consequence factor. It could also evolve 
the code for the global report to account for different impact measurements. Future work 
should also test and validate the alternative approach to risk calculation and query, 
contained in the model in the Appendix Section D, on use cases with more than two 
cyber threats and iterative processes to refine how MP assesses and displays risk in more 
complex use cases. It could additionally incorporate risk mitigation actions into the 
model and test how the risk assessment changes in response to the addition of 
countermeasures.  
Future work could also include research that informs DOD and other agency 
policies and practices. Research could do a more detailed comparison of the way MP 
assesses and visualizes risk compared to existing DOD tools, especially the risk matrix. It 
could make recommendations for how DOD could evolve its approach to risk 
assessment, including by incorporating MP models into risk management activities. 
Future research, or actual risk assessment practitioners, could also use MP to conduct a 
real-world risk assessment, with subject matter expert input and decision maker feedback, 
to assess the utility of the model and approach compared to existing tools. Feedback from 
real practitioners on real examples would be very valuable in informing how to best 
evolve MP to support analysts and decision makers responsible for managing risk.  
At a time when the idea of a cyber-attack on the jet fuel supply chain is not just an 
academic excursion, but a real-world headline, there is an urgent need for more intuitive, 
interactive, and responsive tools to support decision makers. The extended Moebius 
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methodology with the global report, and the single-threat and two-threat use case baseline 
models, now exist with unlimited distribution so analysts and decision makers can 
explore risk in more comprehensive ways than current tools allow. It is the author’s hope 
that decision makers will recognize the opportunity MP provides to enhance risk 
assessment and employ the tool—not just at the analyst console, but in the board room—
to secure critical systems, infrastructure, and supply chains from future cyber-attack.  
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APPENDIX. MONTEREY PHOENIX CODE 
This section contains the MP software code associated with the models in this 
thesis. Each section corresponds to a model used in this thesis, organized by order of 
appearance in the document.  
A. MP CODE FOR JET FUEL SUPPLY CHAIN USE CASE 
This MP software code is for the model developed by the team of NSA interns to 















Figure 25. MP Code for Jet Fuel Supply Chain Use Case. Source: Alden et 
al. (2020). 
B. MP CODE FOR THE BARGE USE CASE  
This MP software code is for the barge model. It was conceived by Nathan Alden, 
one of the student interns that developed the jet fuel supply chain model, and revised by 






Figure 26. MP Code for the Barge Use Case. 
C. MP CODE FOR THE USE CASE WITH TWO CYBER THREATS 
This MP software code is for the model with two cyber threats to the jet fuel 
supply chain. The author developed this model by combining and adapting code from the 
jet fuel supply chain model developed by the NSA interns and from the barge model 
developed by Nathan Alden and revised by Dr. Kristin Giammarco. Dr. Giammarco 



















Figure 27. MP Code for Model with Two Cyber Threats.  
D. MP CODE FOR MORE THAN TWO CYBER THREATS  
This MP software code is for models with more than two cyber threats or iterative 
processes. It was developed by Dr. Kristin Giammarco while validating the model with 
two cyber threats in Section C. The main changes from the Section C model occur in the 













Figure 28. MP Code for Model with More than Two Cyber Threats. 
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